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Over the last four decades world economy has experienced several wide swings in 
energy prices. These swings have very serious repercussions for countries of Asian, in 
general, and South Asian regions, in particular; the latter having tremendous economic 
potential. Rapidly growing economies like India, China and Pakistan will face serious 
energy crisis if they do not plan well for future needs. Energy is one of the most critical 
inputs to several variety of production function. And we have very limited ability to 
replace it by other means in the short run, without having serious setback to our GDP.  
Energy conservation is a topic that has been discussed over a long period of time. 
Energy conservation is not a local issue but a global one, affecting the strategic planning 
and policy making of the governments worldwide. Energy conservation is proving as a 
catalyst for globalisation and international trade of energy. 
There are number of challenges for the South Asian region. Energy is at the forefront 
and has not kept pace with rapid economic expansion. This analysis is about transporting gas 
from Iran to Pakistan and then possibly to India. The so called Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas 
pipeline has been named as peace pipeline in the jargon of political language because this will 
be the most credible confidence building measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan. Both 
countries have high stakes involved in this pipeline project. 
An economically viable project might suffer due to geo-political scenario of all the 
three countries involved. One of the main players of this game is United States which is aimed 
at isolating Iran on both economic and political front. How US pursue its policies for this IPI 
pipeline and response of two beneficiaries Pakistan and India is not merely an economic issue 
but a political issue as well but we shall not cover this aspect in our paper.   
Main objective in this paper will be on economic analysis of IPI pipeline. We shall 
develop different scenarios of Iranian gas export to Pakistan and India in the presence of 
different strategic behaviours on the part of each player. We shall model both cooperative 
and non-cooperative behaviour of these players. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the pioneering effort of modelling the IPI 
pipeline under game theoretic framework. Many newspaper articles have been written on 
the IPI pipeline but no formal effort of modelling the whole scenario under some 
theoretical reasoning has been carried out.   
1.  INTRODUCTION  
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Almost three-quarters of the world’s natural gas reserves are located in the Middle 
East and Eurasia. Russia, Iran, and Qatar combined accounted for about 58 percent of the 
world’s natural gas reserves as of January 1, 2007. Iran is the second largest producer of 
natural gas with its major natural gas fields at South and North Pars, Tabnak, and 
Kangan-Nar. According to Oil and Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 974 trillion cubic 
feet (Tcf) in proven natural gas reserves, about 15.8  percent of world’s total (see 
Appendix-I). Of all the natural gas fields in Iran, the most yielding one is the offshore 
South Pars field, which is estimated to have 450 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves 
accounting for about 47 percent of Iran’s total natural gas reserves [Energy Information 
Administration (2007)]. Since the discovery of South Pars field, in 1990, Iran has been 
proposing for a pipeline project that can transport the Iranian gas to Pakistan and India.  
The US $7.4 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) line is expected to transport Iranian 
natural gas south to the Asian subcontinent, with a proposed 1724 miles and a 5.4 Billion 
cubic feet (Bcf) capacity [Energy Information Administration (2007)]. From South Pars, 
a pipeline will stretch over 1,100 kilometres within Iran before entering Pakistan, 
travelling through Khuzdar. One section will run through Karachi, the main section going 
through Multan to the Indian border (760 kilometres), thereafter travelling 860 kilometres 
to Delhi. 
Pakistan and Iran signed a preliminary agreement in 1995 for the construction of a 
natural gas pipeline linking Karachi with the South Pars natural gas field. Iran and India 
signed an agreement for an overland natural gas pipeline in 1993, and in 2002 Iran and 
Pakistan signed an agreement on a feasibility study for such a pipeline. Iran later 
proposed an extension of the pipeline into India, with Pakistan standing to benefit from 
transit fees. The pipeline would supply both countries with gas: India with 90 million 
cubic meters per day and Pakistan 60 million cubic meters per day [United Press 
International (2008)]. In April 2008 Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf met his Iranian 
counterpart Ahmedinejad in Pakistan; among several other issues IPI has been a main 
gist. It is believed that Iran and Pakistan have resolved all issues regarding the IPI 
pipeline project and the final agreement may be inked soon. During the meeting, Iranian 
president Ahmedinejad stated “Pakistan and Iran are like one soul in two bodies”. In 
response to Pakistani proposal for allowing China to receive gas from the IPI from 
Pakistan, Iran showed a positive response, which indicates that in case the project 
materialises, even without India’s participation, Pakistan can still enjoy the status of a 
transit country.   
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Fig. 1. Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Pipeline 
 
Source: U.S. Government. 
Pakistan has always been enthusiastic to start IPI project but India has whether 
explicitly or implicitly shown reluctance to join the project. The IPI project has been 
pending due to many geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic factors, but 
concentrating on the geo-economic ones, mainly due to the transit fee issues. Pakistan has 
been demanding transit fee of US 50 cents per million British Thermal Units (MBTU), 
while India wants it to be US 15 cents per MBTU.  
It is interesting that other countries especially China has shown interest in joining 
this IPI project. China told Pakistan that Beijing is keen on importing 1.05 billion cubic 
feet of gas from Iran through the pipeline if India does not participate in the project [Press 
TV 11 February (2008)]. Indian officials did not attend the last few meetings on the 
pipeline, citing their problems with pricing. 
Rapidly growing countries; China and India have great dependence on energy 
import and it continues to be an issue of immense importance for the sustainable growth 
rate of 7-9 percent for both the countries. The question is that, how Iranian gas reaches 
Pakistan and India? In the case of the former, issue of gas import from Iran is not a 
serious problem because the two countries have their common borders. For India it’s an 
issue economic-cum geo-political. India can import Iranian gas through Pakistan the most 
viable economic route but politically fragile one given the past history of both the 
countries. Both countries lack confidence in each other. Nevertheless, many assume that 
Pakistan will never sabotage this project because it has its own economic interest in form 
of transit fee of about $700 million per year.  
Iran seems to be interested in gas exports mainly because of its transition economy 
where unemployment is rising and budget deficits have been a chronic problem. About 
18 percent of the Iran’s population lives below the poverty line and unemployment rate is 
about 11 percent [CIA world Factbook (2007)]. Iran has abundant resources of natural 
gas and crude oil, oil and natural gas meet 40 percent and 49 percent, respectively, of the 
Iran’s energy demands (Energy Information Administration). Beyond the geo-economic 
factor another geo-political point of view is that Iran can make India and Pakistan, and 
possibly China as its allies in the South Asian region and thus the so called monopoly of 
the US, in the region, can be endangered. US has been opposing the materialisation of the 
IPI project mainly because it fears that Iran can play a vital role in South Asia once it 
becomes a gas supplier for the two major countries of the region i.e., India and Pakistan. 
Iran has been working to develop nuclear weapons and is supporting international 
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terrorism; that is what believed by the US government. Iran has been assuring on several 
occasions that it is interested in IPI pipeline for general economic development and not 
for consolidating its nuclear weapons.   
India is also facing energy crises that may catch momentum if not addressed 
timely.  Regarding natural gas, in the International Energy Outlook 2007 (IEO) 
reference case, natural gas consumption in the non-OECD countries grows more than 
twice as fast as in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries. Led by demand in China and India, natural gas consumption 
in non-OECD Asia is projected to expand by 4.6 percent per year on average from 
2004 to 2030. India’s natural gas consumption is projected to rise rapidly in the mid-
term, growing by 6.2 percent per year on average from 2004 to 2015 [Energy 
Information Administration (2007)].  
In economic horizon Pakistan’s Interest in IPI is vivid as it is an energy deficient 
country, though not as much as is India or China. Energy consumption in Pakistan has 
grown significantly over the last few decades due to a rapidly growing economy. Energy 
shortfall seems to be one of the hurdles in the quest towards economic growth of 
Pakistan. In its second quarterly report for fiscal year 2006, State Bank of Pakistan 
indicated that the energy demand-supply gap was 47 percent in 2006. Major gas fields are 
very mature and supplies will decline from 2010. Energy shortage is badly affecting the 
economic growth of Pakistan. It is expected to moderate to 6.3 percent in financial year 
2008 and then pick up slightly to 6.5 percent in financial year 2009, underpinned by 
consumption expenditures. These forecasts are lower than the average 7 percent growth 
rate of recent years, as the ongoing power and gas shortages caused by an aging energy 
infrastructure, chronic underinvestment in expansion and maintenance, and unsustainable 
pricing regimes slow production and constrain domestic and foreign investment. [Asian 
Development Bank (2008)].  
Natural gas and oil meet 51 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of the Pakistan’s 
energy demand [Pakistan Energy Yearbook (2006)]. The total production of natural gas is 
1.40 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf) at the rate of 900Btu. If Pakistan has to decrease the energy 
demand-supply gap then it has to devise its energy policy efficiently.  
In the presence of such conditions, Pakistan is bound to streamline the issue of 
natural gas and electricity shortage. There may be various courses of action, while 
considering the gas import. Gas reserves are not expected to meet the supply shortfall and 
IPI project may prove a doorstep in converting Pakistan as economic tiger of the region.  
Iran may be one of the potential exporters of natural gas to India. India has three 
options to acquire natural gas from Iran (i) in the form of LNG (liquefied natural gas), 
using LNG fleets through the Arabian Sea (ii) through a deep sea pipeline or (iii) through 
land route. The land-based option seems quite cheaper than all other options even after 
including transit fee payments to Pakistan.   
2.  IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA IN A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 
Hirschhausen, et al. (2005) has carried out an analysis, of the transportation of 
Russian gas to Western Europe. Our model is different in structure and implications than 
the Hirschhausen, et al. (2005) model. Before we specify the model of the IPI gas 
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pipeline we identify the fundamental difference between the cooperative and non-
cooperative strategy with reference to countries involved.  
Let 
(i) p denotes the price of imported gas in Pakistan,  
(ii) pLNG denotes the price of liquefied natural gas in Pakistan,  
(iii) x denotes the total amount of gas exported by Iran, through IPI pipeline, to 
Pakistan and India, 
(iv) y denotes the total amount of gas imported by Pakistan,  
(v)  B denotes the benefits that Pakistan will earn from the IPI pipeline (B =      
pLNG – p),   
(vi) cI and cP denote the respective constant per unit cost  of Iran and Pakistan,  
(vii) y(p) denotes the gas import function for Pakistan with y(p) >
 
0 and [ y(p) / p] 
< 0 p > 0,  
(viii) Assume that IPI pipeline is the only way of transporting Iranian gas to Pakistan 
and India.  
For Iran and Pakistan we define the following strategies:  
Non-Cooperative strategy: Iran and Pakistan independently determine the 
export quantity (or the final price for gas) and benefits so as to maximise their 
respective profits.  
Cooperative strategy: Iran and Pakistan determine the profit-maximising 
amount of imported gas and share the total  benefits. 
Furthermore, let us denote; 
(*)Inc = (p – cI)x as Iran’s profits for the non-cooperative strategy and *ncx = 
argmaxx>0 { Inc (p)} or *ncp = argmaxp>0 { Inc (p)} as solution for Iran’s profit-
maximisation problem; 
p
nc (*) = (B – cp)x as Pakistan’s profits for the non-cooperative strategy and 
)}({maxarg 0* bB pncbnc as solution for Pakistan’s profit-maximisation 
problem; 
(*)(*)(*) PncIncnc  as aggregate profits of the non-cooperative strategy  
xccBp PIc )((*) as total profits of the cooperative strategy and 
)}({maxarg 0* xx cxc or )}({maxarg 0* xp cpc
 
as solution for Iran’s and 
Pakistan’s joint profit maximisation problem.   
Finally, we assume that all the above profit functions are continuous and quasiconcave 
(so that *ncx , *ncp , *ncB , *cx  and *cp exist and are unique). 
Then using results of Hirschhausen, et al. (2005), we have,  
Proposition 1: Profits of the cooperative strategy are always greater than or equal to 
aggregate profits of the non-cooperative strategy: (*)(*) ncc . Furthermore, the 
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transit quantity ( or the gas price) is always greater (lesser) or equal in its level in the 
non-cooperative strategy:  **** ( nccncc ppxx .  
Proof: For the non-cooperative strategy, maximum aggregate profits are 
****
00 )()()(max)(max(*)(*)(*) ncPncncIncPbIxPncIncnc xcBxcpxx
*** )( ncPncInc xcBcp
 
 or ***00
* )()(max)(max ncPncIncPbIxnc xcBcpxxx . However, because 
*
nc
x ( or *
ncp ) and *ncB are chosen within two separate problems, aggregate profits (*)nc
cannot exceed maximum profits for the cooperative solution in which *cx is directly 
chosen to maximise the same expression * *0arg max { ( )} ( )c x c I P cx x p B c c x . 
Now the regularity condition of quasi-concavity imposed on (*) ( )Pnc PB c x requires 
that / 0x B . Thus if Pakistan gains zero benefits from the IPI project  in the 
cooperative strategy and shares total profits with Iran then  (*)nc cannot exceed 
maximum profits for the cooperative solution. Because if (*)
nc
 exceeds *
cx  then Ic p .  
Hence it is proved that * *
c ncx x   or 
* *
c ncp p .  
Now we shall extend this general result to a specific situation.  
1.  Non-cooperative Strategy (Two Players) 
Under prevailing circumstances Iranian gas can reach Pakistan through LNG 
method or through a pipeline. In geo-economic aspect the pipeline may benefit Pakistan 
if 0B . Symbolically speaking, we can say that Iran being the main supplier of gas to 
Pakistan, sets an export quantity x to maximise its profits ( )I Ip c x . It is assumed 
that the relationship between p and x is direct, so that the function ( )p x is increasing and 
( ) 0p x
x
. It is plain to envisage that the two players Iran and Pakistan have almost same  
bargaining power;  
Iran is very wholehearted to start the IPI pipeline project to pace up its collapsing 
economy and to defend itself against the embargoes and trade restriction imposed by 
countries like United States and United Kingdom. It also wants to develop friendly ties 
with two important countries of the region i.e. Pakistan and India. India is reluctant on 
their part due to the US pressure and fears of US that Iran may become a strong country 
through its nuclear energy programme. Iran has to keep an inviting tone rather than 
dictating one with reference to IPI pipeline project. Pakistan is enthusiastic for IPI 
because of energy shortfall that it is facing. Pakistan is also interested because of the 
transit benefits and lower cost it can enjoy (when compared with prevalent LNG prices). 
All in all Iran the supplier needs foreign exchanges to support the economy. So both Iran 
and Pakistan do not have much bargaining power on the IPI pipeline issue.  
The First Order Condition (FOC) for Iran’s profit maximisation problem requires 
that the optimal price of exported gas  ( x ) to be so as to ensure  
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,0)(
p
x
cpx
p I
I 
… … … … … (1)  
Pakistan problem is to enjoy maximum benefits from importing x
 
units of gas 
from Iran through IPI pipeline. Since benefits of Pakistan are portrayed by the 
quantity B, which is the price differential between price of gas through IPI pipeline 
and price of gas otherwise (where we have attributed LNG to be the other source). 
Cetris Peribus the benefits of Pakistan will increase as the amount of gas imported 
increase. The underlying mechanism is that if the price differential is Bi (say) for i 
units of import through IPI pipeline then Bi+1 > Bi, where Bi is the benefits to 
Pakistan on importing i units of gas from Iran through IPI pipeline. The highest 
possible benefits will be earned when Pakistan imports gas from Iran on the 
minimum price. But Iran will set the price not at the minimum but at the optimum 
level ensuring the optimum volume of trade x. So benefits of Pakistan are directly 
dependent on x that is to say B = B(x).  With this prior setup and background 
information, the FOC for Pakistan is;  
,0)( PP cBB
x
x
B
,Popt c
xB  where .0
B
x 
… … … … (2) 
Assume that if quantity imported/demanded by Pakistan increases, suppliers shall 
offer higher prices. Therefore the gas imports function for Pakistan, is given by 
y (p) = x + x0 = a p, … … … … … … (3) 
where x0 is the gas imported by Pakistan from any other source  and  a > 0 is an 
exogenous parameter.  
Using (3) and (1), we get  
.0,
2
)( 0
0
0
00
p
x
a
acxp Iopt … … … … (4) 
This optimum price depends purely on the cost structure of the Iran and the 
exogenous parameters of the gas import functions of the gas in Pakistan. Finally using (4) 
as Pakistan best-response function (given in (2)) the optimum benefits that Pakistan ought 
to enjoy are, 
,
2
)(1
0
00
p
I
opt c
a
acxB … … … … … (7)  
This solution is termed as non-cooperative as it does not assume partnership 
between the two major players Iran and Pakistan   
2.  Cooperative Strategy (Two Players)  
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In the cooperative strategy, Iran and Pakistan jointly maximise the aggregate 
profits (benefits) and then share it between themselves. It is important that we can utilise 
the aggregate profit function under non-cooperation, given by c(*) = (p + B – cI – cP)x. 
Simply maximising this aggregate profit function w.r.t x will provide an estimate of the 
optimal quantity of gas that should be exported by Iran to Pakistan.  
However, another more formal approach is to use the Nash Product.  Let the joint 
profit (or benefit) be distributed among Pakistan and Iran according to Nash bargaining 
criteria. For two players, the Nash product is defined as the product of each player’s 
profit under cooperative environment after deduction of the profit under non-cooperative 
environment.  
Let NPIP denote the Nash product, when two players Iran and Pakistan are 
considered.  Then NPIP is given by, 
coopnoncoopcoopnoncoop PPIIIPNP  .  … … … (8)  
If Iran and Pakistan play under cooperation then Iran’s profits are characterised by 
the function,  
,)(
coopcoopcoop PIpPII BccxpxB
  
… …. …. (9) 
Where xBB
coopP * is the fixed benefits offered to Pakistan by Iran, under cooperation 
agreement.  
Since both Pakistan’s and Iran’s supreme interest is not to stall the mega IPI 
pipeline so we assume that  non-cooperation can only occur if India remains reluctant to 
start the IPI pipeline. In that case Pakistan may become the only potential customer of the 
Iranian gas and then Pakistan can play a role of monopolistic customer. Similarly, Iran 
can be a monopolistic supplier if Pakistan has no options of imports other than that of 
Iran. Several other assumptions can be stated before we assume monopoly of Iran and 
Pakistan, but we shall not go into intricate geopolitical details of the issue. 
Coming back to the identification of the profits of Iran and Pakistan under non-
cooperation, we say that 
MonopolyI and MonopolyP are the respective profits of Iran and 
Pakistan. Therefore, the Nash product in (8) can be restated as: 
MonopolycoopMonopolycoop PPIPIIP BBNP … … … (10)  
Now, we shall seek the optimal benefits that Pakistan should gain, to maximise the 
aggregate profits under joint venture (cooperation). Maximising the Nash product in (10) 
w.r.t  
coopPB  yields; 
,0
MonopolycoopMonopolycoop
coop
IPIPP
P
IP BB
B
NP  
… … (11)  
which implies that  
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2
MonopolyMonopoly
coop
IIPopt
PB
 
… … … … … (12)  
Thus optimum benefits for Pakistan are 50 percent of the profit-maximising 
surplus in the Nash product solution.  
Now, incorporating the optimum benefits from (12) into the Nash product (10), the 
Nash product can be restated as follows, 
Monopoly
MonopolyMonopoly
I
IIP
IIPNP 2  
      ,
2
*
Monopoly
MonopolyMonopoly
P
IIP 
        
2
0
2
))(()(
0 MonopolyMonopoly IPIP xapcccapP 
… … (13)  
Maximising (13)  w.r.t   p,  yields  the  optimum  selling  price  of  gas  for        
Iran ( purchase price for Pakistan).  
0
00
2
))((
a
accxp IPcoopopt .  … … … … … (14) 
This optimum price depends purely on the cost structure of the players and the 
exogenous parameters of the gas import functions of the gas in Pakistan and India. In 
cooperative strategy the optimum benefits of Pakistan are independent of marginal 
impact of Pakistan’s benefits, whereas reverse is the case in non-cooperation. 
Furthermore, as stated in proposition (1), the total benefits of the cooperative strategy are 
always greater than the total benefits of the non-cooperative strategy. Iran and Pakistan 
have relatively friendly ties and Pakistan can plausibly cooperate with Iran.   
3.  IPI IN THREE-PLAYERS SET-UP 
Now we introduce India as a third player of the mega IPI game and develop the 
three players’ scenario, by using following notations  
Let  
(i) pPA denotes the price of imported gas in Pakistan,  
(ii) pIN denotes the price of imported gas in India,  
(iii) pLP denotes the price of liquefied natural gas in Pakistan,  
(iv) pLI denotes the price of liquefied natural gas in India,  
(v) t denote the transit fee Pakistan may earn on transiting gas from IPI to India,  
(vi) yPA denote the amount of gas imported by Pakistan by Iran,  
(vii) yIN denote the amount of gas imported by India, 
(viii) yIO denote the gas imported by India from sources other than Iran, 
(ix) yPO denote the gas imported by Pakistan from sources other than Iran, 
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(x) ytot (= yIN + yPA) denotes the total amount of gas exported by Iran, through IPI 
pipeline, to Pakistan and India, 
(xi)  BPA denotes the benefits that Pakistan will earn from the IPI pipeline (BPA = 
pPA – pLP + t),   
(xii) BIN denotes the benefits that India will earn from the IPI pipeline (BIN =         
pIN – pII),   
(xiii) cIR and cPA and cIN denote the respective constant per unit cost  of Iran, 
Pakistan and India ,  
(xiv) xP denotes the demand function of Pakistan for gas imports with xP >
 
0 and 
( xP / p) < 0 p > 0, such that the inverse demand function p = px > 0 exists 
with ( xP / p) < 0,  
(xv) xI denotes the demand function of India for gas imports with xI > 0 and ( xI / 
p) < 0 p > 0, such that the inverse demand function p = px > 0 exists with 
( xI  / p) < 0,  
(xvi) Assume that IPI pipeline is the only way of transporting Iranian gas to Pakistan 
and India.  
For each of the three players we define the following strategies:  
Non-cooperative strategy: Iran, Pakistan and India take independent decisions to 
maximise their individual profit functions. Iran determines the final price and 
amount of gas that it allows to be exported, Pakistan determines the allowable 
transit quantity and India determines the quantity it imports through IPI and both 
Pakistan and India set their own prices.  
Cooperative strategy: Iran, Pakistan and India determine the joint profit-
maximising values of final price, amount of gas, transit quantity and quantity of 
imported gas through IPI.  
Furthermore, let us denote;  
(*) ( )IRnc PA IN IR totp p c y as Iran’s profits for the non-cooperative strategy 
and * 0arg max { ( )}IRnc x nc y or * 0arg max { ( )}IRnc p ncp p as solution for Iran’s 
profit-maximisation problem; 
(*) ( )PAnc PA PA PAB c y as Pakistan’s profits for the non-cooperative strategy 
and * 0arg max { ( )}PAPA b ncncB b as solution for Pakistan’s profit-maximisation 
problem; 
(*) ( )INnc IN IN INB c y as India’s profits for the non-cooperative strategy and 
*
0arg max { ( )}ININ b ncncB b as solution for India’s profit-maximisation 
problem; 
(*)nc (*) (*) (*)IR P INnc nc nc as aggregate profits of the non-cooperative 
strategy  
Game Theoretic Framework for Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline 547
 
(*) ( )c PA IN PA IN IR PA INp p B B c c c x as total profits of the 
cooperative strategy and )}({maxarg 0* xx cxc or )}({maxarg 0* xcpc   
as solution of for Iran’s and Pakistan’s joint profit maximisation problem.  
Finally, we assume that all the above profit functions are continuous and 
quasiconcave.  
Using Proposition 1 (stated in 3.1), in three players’ setup, the profits of the cooperative 
strategy will be greater than the profits in non-cooperative strategy.   
1.  Non-cooperative Strategy (Three Players) 
In three players setup Iran, India and Pakistan have almost equal standings, as far 
as bargaining on IPI is concerned; Iran is eager to find buyers of its gas and both India 
and Pakistan are amid energy crisis. Pakistan being the transit country may have an added 
benefit in the form of transit fee.  
Pakistan’s interest is to maximise with respect to benefits it can gain through IPI. 
Pakistan wants to enjoy maximum benefits from importing x units of gas from Iran 
through IPI pipeline. Since benefits of Pakistan are portrayed by the quantity BPA.  Cetris 
Peribus the benefits of Pakistan will increase as the amount of gas imported increase. The 
underlying mechanism is that if the price differential is (BPA) (say) for i units of import 
through IPI pipeline then (BPA)i+1 > (BPA)i, where (BPA)i is the benefits to Pakistan on 
importing i units of gas from Iran through IPI pipeline. The highest possible benefits will 
be earned when Pakistan imports gas from Iran on the minimum price and maximum 
transit fee. Following the inverse demand convention, Pakistan may charge a higher rate 
of transit fee if the volume of gas transit to India is high.  It implies that transit fee, and 
consequently benefits of Pakistan, are dependent on the volume of trade ytot, that is to say 
B = B(ytot).  With this prior setup and background information, the FOC for Pakistan is;  
,0PPAtot
PA
P cBy
B 
Where ,0
PA
tot
B
y
 then  
.PA
tot
optPA c
yB … … … … … … (15) 
Now, concentrating on Iran’s profit maximisation, profits are supposed to be 
maximised with respect to the optimum prices of imported gas in India and Pakistan, 
through IPI.   
The Pakistan’s gas import function is given by, 
w = yPA + yPO = bpPA, … … … … … … (16)  
where b > 0.  
India’s gas import function is given by,  
z = yIN + yIO = cpIN, … … … … … … (17)  
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where c > 0.  
Maximisation of Iran’s profit function w.r.t pPA, yields  
.0,
2
)()(
1
1
11
PA
POIOPOINIR
optPA p
y
b
yycbpbcp … (18)   
Substitution of (18) in Iran’s profit function and then maximising w.r.t pIN yields  
,
3
4
k
kp
optIN
 
… … … … … … … (19) 
,2
IN
IO
p
y
,
2
)(
1
1
1 b
yybck INPOIR 
,
2 1
1
2 b
cbk 
,2222 222
2
2223 kbkbkckck
          .2 22211221214 IRIRIRIOPOIOPO ckbccckckykykbkkyybkk  
2.  Cooperative Strategy (Three Players) 
Just like two players setup we use the Nash Product.  Let the joint profit (or 
benefit) be distributed among Iran, Pakistan and India according to Nash bargaining 
criteria. Iran and Pakistan negotiate a fixed value of transit fee for the quantity, INy , to 
be transported to India through Pakistan. In this way benefits of Pakistan are also fixed 
mutually by Iran and Pakistan.  
Let NPIPI denote the Nash product, when three players Iran, Pakistan and India are 
considered.  Then NPIPI is given by, 
).()(
monopolyBcoopmonopolyBcoopcoop PAPAIRPAIRIPI BBNP … … (21) 
Now, we shall seek the optimal benefits that Pakistan should gain, to maximise the 
aggregate profits under joint venture (cooperation). Maximising the Nash product in (21) 
w.r.t 
coopPAB  yields; 
.
2
MonopolyMonopoly
coop
IRIRPA
optPA
B
 
… … … … (22)  
Now, incorporating the optimum benefits from (22) into Nash Product in (21), the Nash 
product can be restated as  
,
2
monopolyBmonopolyB PAIRIR
IPINP 
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,
2
2
monopolyBmonopolyB PAIRINIRPAINPAPAININ ytcccyypyp (23) 
Using (16) and (17) and maximising (23) w.r.t INp , yields the optimum quantity of gas 
exports to India.  
.)1(
)()()(
2
22
c
ctccccy
p IRPAINIO
optIN … … … (24)  
Similarly optimum value of  pPA may easily be found.   
It may be noted that, in a three player setup, under cooperative strategy the 
optimum prices are dependent on the exogenous parameters of the gas import functions 
of India and Pakistan, the cost structures of the players and the amount of gas imported 
by India and Pakistan from sources other than Iran.   
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have explored the IPI gas pipeline benefits to Iran, Pakistan and India under 
two different scenarios cooperation versus non-cooperation. All three countries can enjoy 
economic growth and prosperity by materialising IPI pipeline project.  The whole 
scenario of profit-maximisation has also been studied under three players setup. In both 
the cases cooperative strategies are beneficial for all three countries. We have ignored 
geo-political aspects of the project which can be considered by some political economy 
student in some other paper. One limitation in our paper is the lack of any data on the 
variables we have included in our model and therefore, we have not been able to carry 
out any simulation analysis of the results which would have helped in finding out the 
magnitude of the benefits all the three countries will reap. Last but not the least IPI gas 
pipeline project  in no way implies that Pakistan and India can afford to take risk of not 
exploring other means of energy both domestic and international.    
APPENDIX-I  
Table 1  
World Natural Gas Reserves by Country as of January 1, 2007 
Producers 
Reserves 
( Trillion 
Cubic Feet) 
% of World 
Total Producers 
Reserves 
( Trillion 
Cubic Feet) 
% of World 
Total 
Russia 1680 27.17 Kazakhstan 100 1.617 
Iran 974 15.75 Indonesia 98 1.584 
Qatar 911 14.73 Norway 82 1.326 
Saudi Arabia 240 3.881 China 80 1.293 
UAE 214 3.461 Malaysia 75 1.213 
USA 204 3.299 Uzbekistan 65 1.051 
Nigeria 182 2.943 Egypt 59 0.954 
Algeria 162 2.620 Canada 58 0.938 
Venezuela 152 2.458 Kuwait 55 0.889 
Iraq 112 1.811 Rest of World 581 9.396 
Asghar and Nazuk 550
Turkmenistan 100 1.617 World’s Total 6183 100.00 
Energy Information Administration, Report #:DOE/EIA-0484 (2007), Release Date: May 2007.  
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